Beyond the senses: perception, the environment, and vision impairment by Petty, Karis Jade
Beyond the senses: perception, the environment, and vision 
impairment
Article  (Published Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Petty, Karis Jade (2021) Beyond the senses: perception, the environment, and vision impairment. 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. pp. 1-18. ISSN 1359-0987 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/92216/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
Beyond the senses: perception,
the environment, and vision
impairment
Karis Jade Petty University of Sussex
The ‘sensory turn’ in anthropology has generated a significant literature on sensory perception and
experience. Whilst much of this literature is critical of the compartmentalization of particular ‘senses’,
there has been limited exploration of how anthropologists might examine sensory perception beyond
‘the senses’. Based on ethnographic fieldwork with people who have impaired vision walking the South
Downs landscape in England, this article develops such an approach. It suggests that the experiences
of seeing in blindness challenge the conceptualization of ‘vision’ (and ‘non-vision’). In place of ‘vision’
(as a sense), the article explores ‘activities of seeing’ – an approach that contextualizes the visual to
examine the biographically constituted and idiosyncratic nature of perception within an environment.
Through an ethnography of seeing with anatomical eyes and ‘seeing in the mind’s eye’, it articulates an
approach that avoids associating perception with anatomy, or compartmentalizing experience into
‘senses’.
When I volunteered in 2012 as a sighted guide to walk the South Downs landscapes
in East Sussex, England, with people who have impaired vision, I was surprised how
vividly my companions described what they could ‘see’. Rachel1 described what her
blindness ‘looked like’, narrating the smoky-coloured patches and gradations of her
visual field like she was reading a map. Although identifying as ‘partially sighted’ –
explaining that she could see with her anatomical eye2 – Rachel also described herself
as ‘blind’. Being ‘sighted’ and ‘blind’ was a liminal experience that was interpersonally
relational, altering throughout her life course, and changing with the nuanced textures
of the light in which she was immersed. The qualities of Rachel’s sensory perceptions
were not consistent: the world was alive with light and colour in some moments, but
only ‘black’ with immense absence in others. By contrast, Karl described himself as
‘totally blind’, with no light perception, but explained that he could ‘see all the time’.
This was a ‘phantom vision’ from the sight he had earlier in his life, an embodied way
of seeing that could be intentionally imagined but also ‘triggered’ by the environment
around him: the sensation of a nettle’s sting, or the sounds of the woodland canopy
swaying in the breeze overhead.
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This article proposes an alternative approach to current anthropological imaginings
of vision, shifting from conceptualizing and approaching vision as a sense, to examining
activities of seeing. This is necessary to account for the multiple ways in which people
‘see’ – with and without anatomical eyes – to capture the ambiguities and paradoxes
of seeing in blindness. This line of reasoning points to the implications of a ‘sense’-
based approach that has underpinned anthropological conceptualizations of sensorial
perception, addressing what this means for anthropological understandings of vision,
and, through this, the concept of ‘senses’ more broadly. As Pink explained, ‘senses’
have become a key theme in contemporary anthropology (2010: 331). Whilst the
term ‘sensorium’ is used to refer to the continuum of sensory perception prior to its
segmentation into ‘senses’, anthropologists have been primarily concerned with the
distinctions of the sensorium into ‘senses’ (see Howes 1991; Howes and Classen 2019
[1991]). Notions of ‘senses’ have been central to the historical framing of the sensory
body and integral to how anthropologists have approached the sensorium. In the
developments of an anthropology of the senses and sensory anthropology, there has
been an emphasis on developing accounts of the ‘relationship between senses’ (Howes
2010: 334), their ‘interconnectedness’ (Pink 2010: 331) and ‘interplay’ (Grasseni 2007a:
1). Anthropologists have used various terms to discuss configurations of senses and
their relationships, including ‘multisensoriality’ (Pink 2009) and ‘intersensoriality’
(Connor 2004; Howes 2005). These terms have the potential to challenge distinctions
between ‘senses’ and avoid the methodological privileging of one sense, yet this article
proposes an alternative approach to studying perception, one that is not ‘sense’-
orientated.
Framing anthropological investigation of sensorial experience around the notion
of ‘senses’ as categories of study and analysis can risk categorizing often ambiguous
perceptual experience (Petty 2015). As Irving suggested, ‘[A]nthropology glosses over
individual differences to generate orderly theories about disordered messy bodies’
(2009: 311-12). Further, in describing the characterizations of vision and hearing in
the Western tradition, Ingold proposed that ‘there are puzzles and inconsistencies
which suggest that these distinctions may reflect more upon the preconceptions of
anthropological analysts than upon the actual sensory experience of the peoples
among whom they have worked’ (2000: 252). Using analytic notions of ‘senses’ as an
anthropological method can risk compartmentalizing (ormissing) nuances of sensorial
experience. It can obscure the ways in which perceptual phenomena not immediately
associated with ‘senses’ are experienced sensorially, such as inner dialogue, ‘seeing in
the mind’s eye’, and the imagination (described through a notion of ‘interiorities’ by
Hogan & Pink 2010; Irving 2011; Rapport 2008).
This is not to say that a sensory approach is redundant. Culturally orientated
studies of the emic configurations, meanings, and experiences of ‘senses’ certainly have
their place in contemporary anthropology and have been integral to the development
of anthropological interest in sensory perception and experience. What this article
problematizes is the assumption that ‘senses’ are given perceptual capacities with
particular qualities and that the notion of ‘senses’ is consistently useful to the study
of sensory experience. The sensory experiences presented in this article of people who
have impaired vision require a rethinking of a ‘sense’-based approach given that the
perceptual experiences discussed here cannot be associated with ‘senses’ in a clear or
useful way. This problematizes broader conceptualizations of the sensory, perceptual
body within which ‘senses’ are located. The sensorial body is often assumed to have
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normative ‘sensory apparatus’ (i.e. not ‘impaired’), which is enculturated. In examining
the sensory experiences of walkers who have impaired vision, the sensory body is
shown to be resolutely idiosyncratic: biographically constituted whilst temporally
transcendent, potentially with multiple body schemas; haemorrhaging notions of
‘interior’ perceptual experience differentiated from that ‘exterior’ to the body, and
inconsistently distinct in the perception of the environment. This article will therefore
propose what I term an inclusively sensorial and sensorially emplaced approach to the
study of sensory experience.
The conceptualization of ‘vision’ as a ‘sense’ for anthropological study is particularly
appropriate to demonstrate the necessity for this new approach. Vision has been
conceptualized and distinguished as a problematic ‘sense’ in the formation of the
anthropology of the senses (see Howes 1991). It has been characterized as a dominating
sense associated with objectification (Ong 1982; Stoller 1989) and distancing (Fabian
1983; Merleau-Ponty 1964; Willerslev 2007), leading to a counter-ocularcentric
anthropological movement to study ‘non-visual’ senses (Fabian 1983; Howes 1991).3
Blindness has often been imagined as the antithesis of ‘vision’. As Elkins described it,
‘[S]ight and blindness are like white and black or on and off: they are opposites, and
when sight is working, blindness is not present’ (1997: 202). By proxy, anthropological
conceptualizations of vision have distinguished it from ‘non-visual’ senses such as touch
and hearing (for discussion, see Howes 1991; Howes & Classen 2019 [1991]), and
studies of vision impairment have often focused on these latter senses (e.g. Golledge
1997; Kitchin, Blades & Golledge 1997; Paterson 2006; 2007).
Following counter-ocularcentric critiques of vision, there has been a move to
reimagine vision within the discipline. Grasseni (2007a) proposed a ‘rehabilitation’ of
visionwithin the discipline, responding to critiques of visualism that had problematized
vision as a method and subject of study. The project of examining ‘skilled visions’
demonstrated the pluralities rather than universality of ‘vision’, proposing that vision
should be reconsidered an embodied, skilled, and trained sense. Grasseni’s edited
volume Skilled visions: between apprenticeship and standards (2007b) demonstrates
these pluralities through methodologies of apprenticeship. In the introduction to this
volume, Grasseni argued that vision is not an ‘isolated’ sense but ‘multisensory’ (2007a:
1-5), proposing that it is through processes of visual enskillment that humans develop
both situated practices and improvisations (2007a: 3-6). Ingold also argued against
the ‘reduction of vision’ present in critiques of visualism (2000: 287). Historicizing
conceptualizations of vision and the distinction of it in relation to other senses such
as hearing and touch – ‘to the extent that they can be distinguished at all’ (2000: 268) –
Ingold introduced the experience of blindness. Drawing on Hull’s exceptional account
of his sight loss, Ingold situated blindness as the lack of vision, distinguished from
‘sighted’ (2000: 271-4).
Yet the premise that ‘vision’ is a stable, distinct category of sensory experience and
analysis is problematic. Admittedly, this is also a broader concern when addressing
‘senses’ in anthropological discussion. An issue that permeates anthropological
engagements with ‘vision’, in particular, is the clarity with which we think we can see ‘it’.
Distinctions of ‘vision’ from ‘non-vision’ or ‘blindness’ are eclipsed in the ethnography
with people who have impaired vision presented. Most people who identify as ‘vision-
impaired’ or ‘blind’ in fact have vision capacities and see. Even people who have no
vision capacity through their anatomical eyes and whose vision is non-congenitally
‘impaired’ describe experiences of ‘seeing in the mind’s eye’, as a ‘phantom vision’.
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‘Blindness’ and ‘seeing’ – non-vision and vision – are not therefore mutually exclusive.
‘Blindness’, aswill be shown, is in fact seen. ‘Vision’ is paradoxically ‘non-visual’. It is thus
problematic to distinguish ‘senses’ as stable, characterizable categories of experience
that are differentiated from other ‘senses’ for our anthropological discussion.
Anthropologists have focused almost exclusively on 20/20 vision both in critiques
of visualism and in the subsequent contributions to ‘rehabilitate’ vision within the
discipline. This has relied upon reified understandings of what constitutes vision, the
visual, and the visible: principally, as that which is apparent through anatomical eyes in
the medium of light for a ‘normative’ sensory subject. This requires us to consider the
‘visionism’ produced in scholarly accounts. ‘Visionism’, based on inherent assumptions
about vision as a given ‘sense’, usually rests on notions of normalized 20/20 vision.
Davis pointed to how this ‘normative’ sensory subject is lodged in the majority of visual
culture studies (2019: 63), and how this, too, is reflected in ophthalmology ‘through its
obsession with seeing properly’ (2019: 68, original emphasis). Case studies of ‘vision
impairment’ require us to reconsider assumptions about the qualities of ‘vision’, what
constitutes the ‘visual’, and consider spectrums of visibility. The case for problematizing
characterizations of other ‘senses’ built from notions of a ‘normative’ sensory body is
pertinentmore widely. Drever, for example, makes a case for recognizing aural diversity
to challenge the ‘tacit preselected audiometric norm or even a pair of golden ears’
underlying understandings of aural perception in sound composition (2019: 85).
The cultural practice of the country walk within the English countryside is a
pertinent case study in addressing anthropological notions of ‘senses’ given the long
association between landscape and seeing within Western thought (Hirsch 1995: 2;
Macpherson 2005; Porteous 1990: 4). Hirsch attributed this ocularcentric legacy to
language, pointing to how the word landscapewas introduced into the English language
as a technical term used by painters in the late sixteenth century, with origins in
the Dutch word ‘landschap’, suggesting that ‘what came to be seen as landscape
was recognized as such because it reminded the viewer of the painted landscape’
(1995: 2). This relationship between landscape, seeing, and painting was argued to
have initiated and crystallized perspectival techniques of viewing the landscape (for
further commentary, see Wylie 2007: 144; cf. Bunkše 2007; Cosgrove & Daniels
1988; Macpherson 2005; Porteous 1990: 4). This was reflected in nineteenth-century
Romanticist notions of the countryside visitor who sits and views the landscape at
vantage points, exercising the believed superior sense of vision whilst unimpeded by
haptic or kinaesthetic sensations (Ingold 2004: 323). In exploring experiences of night-
time art installations within the Scottish countryside for sighted subjects, Nina Morris
suggested that ‘in the dark how one senses what is surrounding is so fully restructured
that it may no longer be appropriate to even label it as landscape, given that this term
has embedded within it a notion of the scene and that which is visible’ (2011: 316). Yet
ethnography of the sensory experiences of the English countryside for people who have
impaired vision – even no anatomical vision – reveals a landscape that ismade visible.
This points to the need to rethink how we interpret notions of vision, the ‘senses’, but
also the landscape more broadly.
This article draws on ethnography of the sensory perception of the South Downs
landscape, England, amongst walkers who have impaired vision to develop an
alternative anthropological approach to the study of sensorial experience: specifically,
a revaluation of the sensory organization of experience in studies of sensoriality. It
presents experiences of Rachel, Karl, Elen, andThomas, who had enjoyed countrywalks
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earlier in life, but now had less opportunity to walk in the countryside as they required
a sighted guide. Walking one-to-one, in a pair, we visited the countryside accessible via
bus, settling on regular visits to a park favoured for its rambling woodlands and open
downland. Together wewalked that park through changingweathers and seasons over a
timespan of two to six years; the majority of the fieldwork took place between 2012 and
2014. A person-orientatedmethodology, this approach aimed to illuminate ‘the hidden
geography within a single human being’ (Bunkše 2007: 219), rather than attempt to
account for the experience of ‘peoplewho have impaired vision’ in a generalizedmanner
as some kind of grouping.
The approach to studying sensory perception that will be proposed is demonstrated
through ethnographic examples of seeingwith anatomical eyes and ‘seeing in themind’s
eye’ as a ‘phantom vision’ experienced amongst people who have impaired vision.4
The former discussion will focus on the experiences of Rachel and Thomas, who
describe their vision as ‘partial’ and ‘congenitally impaired’ (i.e. from birth); whilst
the discussion of ‘phantom vision’ focuses on the experiences of Karl and Elen, who
had both experienced significant sight loss. Karl grew up with what he described as
‘congenital partial sight’, whilst Elen explained that she was ‘fully sighted’ and lost her
sight overnight in her twenties due to illness. These biographical changes in the qualities
of sight and loss are significant in understanding the biographically constituted nature
of sensory experience that will be described.
Studying activities of perception using an inclusively sensorial and sensorially
emplaced approach
The approach proposed is situated within a phenomenological anthropology of
embodiment (following Csordas 1990; Desjarlais & Throop 2011; Ingold 2000; Jackson
1996; Stoller 1997). Examining active and attentive perceptual engagement, this article
proposes study of activities of perception rather than ‘senses’ (e.g. seeing rather
than vision), developing what I term a sensorially emplaced and inclusively sensorial
approach to examine sensory perception. Although this theoretical approach is broadly
applicable to multiplicities of sensory experience, in order to illustrate its formation
and application, whilst contributing to the reimagining of ‘vision’ in anthropology,
this article focuses on phenomena of seeing with anatomical eyes and ‘seeing in the
mind’s eye’, whilst contributing to the reimagining of ‘vision’ in anthropology. These
notions will be outlined in the following paragraphs and then demonstrated through
the ethnographic sections.
I coin the term inclusively sensorial to refer to an approach to studying sensory
perception which avoids: (a) inductive association of anatomy with specific capacities;
and (b) compartmentalizing experience into ‘senses’ methodologically and analytically.
Drawing out sensuous descriptions is a fundamental method in keeping alive the
sensorial ambiguities, paradoxes, and richness of sensory perception throughout the
research process – methodologically, analytically, and theoretically. An inclusively
sensorial approach prioritizes phenomenological experience, in part through avoiding
abstraction, categorization, or generalization of sensorial experience into the
disciplinary conventions of ‘senses’. It thus avoids contributing to the anthropological
imaginings of demarcated ‘senses’ – the issues which were demonstrated through
the characterization of ‘vision’ distinguished from ‘non-visual’ senses. An inclusively
sensorial approach captures the ambiguity of perceptual experience, for example
the difficulties of distinguishing ‘listening’ from ‘feeling’ for echolocators who have
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impaired vision (see Petty 2015) and experiences of ‘seeing’ without anatomical eyes,
as discussed in this article.
The inclusively sensorial approach is enabled by a methodology, proposed in this
article, that focuses on activities of perception rather than ‘senses’. This moves away
from a focus on customary habituations characteristic of an anthropology of practice
(e.g. Bourdieu 1977; Mauss 1973) to the immediacy of the participant’s active and
intentional engagement within an environment as it emerges. A focus on activities
forefronts that perception is active and idiosyncratic in the immediacy of that moment,
that environment, as well as the perceiver’s customary habituations. In the context of
this ethnography, this requires consideration of extended perceptual capacities through
tools such as a monocular. A focus on activities of perception was developed through
noting how my walking companions engaged with the environment in ways that relied
on spontaneity, investigation, improvisation, and adaptation to the present situation
rather than embodying established skills practised for the immediate task or situation
at hand.5 Intentions to ‘see’, for example, incorporate many varied activities, as will
be shown. The quality of each participant’s attention enabled study of activities of
perception in this context. Attention had been intentionally developed throughout the
life course or during rehabituation to sight loss. Attending to sensory subtleties is a
fundamental necessity in performing daily tasks for people who have impaired vision.
As will be shown, ‘attending’, as conscious engagement, involves actively ignoring or
‘backgrounding’ as well as ‘focus’.
Sensorial emplacement is a term developed to refer to the ways in which any
perceptual activity and experience is afforded by, and specific to, both the environmental
conditions (following Gibson 1979) and capacities of the perceiver. Activities of
perception are sensorially emplaced: pertaining to that individual and their capacities
as experienced in that environment at that time. These ideas are well established within
anthropological studies of the perception of the environment (e.g. Ingold 2000), but
the term sensorially emplaced is relevant in that specific attention is given to developing
engagement with, and an account of, the capacities6 of persons. The ethnography
presented demonstrates that the capacities of a person alter – even transform – within
diverse environments. ‘Blindness’ or ‘seeing’, as sensory capacities/experiences, are
not experienced consistently. Capacities are idiosyncratic, mutable, and biographically
constituted. The latter is particularly important when examining sensory rehabituation,
for example, ‘seeing in themind’s eye’ as a ‘phantomvision’ of seeing through anatomical
eyes before sight loss. This will be examined in the ethnographic discussion using
Merleau-Ponty’s (2005 [1962]) notions of the habitual body and present (or actual) body.
A sensorially emplaced approach acknowledges that the environment is not a platform
of perception or something merely ‘out there’ to be perceived, but that perception is
what David Morris referred to as a co-synthesis of the body and the world in one act of
‘co-naissance’ (1999: 280).
Seeing
‘What can you see?’ is a question that Rachel and Thomas were asked regularly in their
everyday lives. The reason for this, Thomas explained, is because ‘people try to work out
how blind we are’. Although registered ‘blind’, they self-identified as ‘partially sighted’,
and were recognized as such by what they called the ‘vision-impaired community’,
because they had some capacity to see with their anatomical eyes. Their hybrid status
as ‘blind’ or ‘partially sighted’ was liminal, shifting in relation to the sight capacities
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of those around them (including myself, referred to as ‘fully sighted’), the sensorially
emplaced qualities of their sensory capacities, and the changing qualities of their
medicalized ‘conditions’, which they referred to regularly in describing their sensory
experiences. Thomas referred to his ‘congenital nystagmus’ and Rachel to ‘congenital
nystagmus and cataracts, with an artificial left eye’. They described nystagmus as the
involuntary movement of the eye(s), alongside their ‘partial’ sight.7 Whilst this offered
some sense of how and what they might see, these qualities were inconsistent and
changed according to variations in light, qualities of attention, and proximity.
Light has been discussed as the ‘medium’ through which we see (Edensor 2013;
Gibson 1979; Ingold 2000; 2005). Ingold proposed that ‘we do not see light, we do see in
light’ (2005: 97). Yet for Rachel and Thomas, who experienced a ‘sensitivity’ to light due
to the nature of their ‘conditions’, light was seen. Light was often the subject, as much as
the medium, of seeing. Nor was it consistently the ‘spark’ of vision (Ingold 2015: 97),
for it also had the potential to cast blindness. Rachel and Thomas often narrated the
changing qualities of the light in detail as we walked, attentive to its diffusion, colour,
‘glare’, tones, and consistency. This varied along the pathways, where the light of the
open downland was relatively consistent compared to the woodlands, which harboured
more complex textures of shade, light at different angles, and diffuse ‘greeny’ tones.
This was an elemental alchemy: the wind cast luminous flashes into shady gloom and
stirred leaves that cast hundreds of constantly shifting shadows onto the pale chalky
path. This rapid dance of woodland light and shadows was intensely ‘distracting’ and
all-consuming. ‘Blindness’ could strike with both light and darkness, eclipsing the sense
of one another. Sudden, extreme changes in the amount of light caused an ‘inability to
see’ that left Rachel and Thomas standing, waiting for their eyes to adjust. This was
common when entering or leaving woodland, but also with changes in the density of
the woodland canopy. Whilst light and shadow are significant in shaping the qualities
of how and what is seen, ‘sight cannot be defined as “an experience of light”’ (Howes
2011: 319). As will be shown, ‘seeing in the mind’s eye’ is potentially independent of
environmental light altogether.
There are spectrums of visibility, and ‘blindness’ is inside rather than outside of
this. ‘Seeing’ is contextual: a ‘seen’ object is produced in relation to the qualities of
other discernible objects. ‘Seeing’ is not inherently objectifying but incurs spectrums
of visibility in which ‘objects’ of varying degrees and characteristics may arise
and become distinguished. ‘Seeing’ did not consistently provide an immediate
comprehension ofwhatRachel or Thomas saw, but indistinguishable colours and shapes
described as ‘light’ or ‘dark’ coloured. To have meaning, one had to ‘look’ – attending
through investigative and purposeful engagement (cf. Elkins 1997: 21-2). This is an
inclusively sensorial activity of the whole body: moving the head, reaching out with
the hands, probing with the fingers, and prodding with the toes (cf. Downey 2007: 227;
Ingold 2000: 261; Lund 2005: 30). As Rachel described it, ‘My head is always down, I
am not glancing around. So, I am using my sight, but I am always feeling, each step – it
sounds really dramatic, but I am!Hands are always out touching’.
To have a sense of what one looked at, rather than its attributes of colour and
shape, was sensorially emplaced. It involved deciphering and deducing what one was
looking at through interpreting the ‘lightness’ or ‘darkness’ of the colour, identifying
shape, and considering context. ‘Seeing’ a ‘view’ – an open expanse of landscape –
was ‘blurred’ and ‘indistinguishable’. Using a monocular (Rachel) or zooming in with a
camera (Thomas), they could ‘join up’ ‘chunks’ of the view using landmarks, identify
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shapes and colours, and thereby deduce what they were looking at. To illustrate, in
describing the view at the top of a downland hill, Rachel explained that ‘a line of dark…
is probablywoodland. But it’s purely by different colours that I knowwhat it is’. There are
therefore spectrums of visibility within the forms and ways of ‘seeing’, with and without
identifiable ‘objects’ seen. Further, colours, shapes, and outlinesmay become the subject,
rather than attributes of it. This is an ontology of seeing the environment in which the
subject is reconfigured not as a ‘thing’ but as its component qualities, such as colour. To
perceive ‘brown’ or a ‘dark colour’ rather than a ‘tree’, for example. This is ‘visual’ in the
qualities of its visibility, rather than ‘object’ produced by those qualities.
‘Seeing’ is not the absence of ‘blindness’: ‘blindness’ can be seen, and ‘seeing’ and
‘blindness’may be experiencedmutually. Further, selective inattentionwithin the ‘visual
field’ was necessary to ‘see’. ‘Looking’ was experienced not as a ‘synergic system’ in
the way that Merleau-Ponty described – ‘gaze, my touch and all my other senses are
together the powers of one and the same body integrated into one and the same
action’ (2005 [1962]: 568) – but as a tiring, inclusively sensorial ‘struggle’. This was
because Rachel and Thomas experienced involuntary, continuous movement of the
eyes, which they explained as characteristic of nystagmus. This movement can be
in any direction, including to the sides, up and down, or in circles, making it very
difficult to focus and creating a sensation of the ‘whole world moving’. This could
be slowed by positioning the head to find the ‘null point’: the gaze position of least
eye movement and ‘best vision’. Further, by looking from preferred angles, Rachel and
Thomas optimized their strongest eye and could ‘spot’ or ‘fix’ their gaze to orientate
around the stigmatism. ‘Spotting’ was a technique of ‘fixing’ attention on an aspect of
the environment, focusing their null point, whilst actively ignoring the wider visual
field characterized by movement. This attention relied on an ability to selectively
discriminate and discipline attention (cf. Grasseni 2007a: 13), specifically within the
sensorially emplaced context. Merleau-Ponty described how seeing is characterized by
a spatio-temporal structure: perspective, field, horizon, foreground, and background.8
In focusing the gaze, some objects inevitably become backgrounded in the visual field,
whilst remaining present and potentially foregrounded at any point (Merleau-Ponty
2005 [1962]: 143). In looking, Rachel and Thomas actively ignored (backgrounded)
aspects of their visual field characterized by distracting movement. They described an
awareness of both the ‘blindness’ and varied qualities of ‘seeing’ that are simultaneously
present. ‘Seeing’, ‘looking’, and ‘blindness’ were intermittent and experienced mutually
– even purposefully – in order to see.
Whilst ‘seeing’ and ‘looking’ are most often distinguished from ‘blindness’,
‘blindness’, ‘blackness’, or ‘absence’ was also seen. This may be the movement Rachel
and Thomas described as ‘nystagmus’, or as patches of absence within the visual field.
As Elkins described it, ‘[T]he blind area may be physically visible as a gray region,
rather than unthought and unseen as a pure absence of sight’ (1997: 216). This points
to how ‘non-vision is therefore inside vision, it is a form of vision and hence a necessary
relationship with vision’ (Althusser, cited in Jay 1993: 329). Seeing is thus an experience
of seeing the qualities of one’s own body – as movement and blurred regions in the
visual field – as well as that experienced as the ‘external’ environment. Seer and world
are blurred in seeing, as what is seen. This is true of all perception. It is made clear
in the experience of seeing with impaired vision, as the perceiver does not see the
landscape as an object separate from themselves as has been articulated in classical
subject-object relations of perspectival landscape perception, but sees their body and
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landscape as suffused. John Hull, in describing his experience of sight loss, prompts an
intriguing reflection on the reconfiguration of self-landscape relations in asking, ‘[I]s it
true that the blind live in their bodies rather than the world?’ (1997: 119). Yet even in
the construction of normalized 20/20 vision, seeing is not a ‘clear lens’ of beholding an
external, distanced world. The perceiver and environment are always fundamentally
fused in perception. Admittedly, this might look less fused, blurred, and fuzzy with
the corrective lenses that the majority of us wear. There is nothing clearly ‘outside’ or
‘separate’ from the body in sensing.
Distance is complex, both as a notion and as an experience. Merleau-Ponty asserted
that distance is the precondition of seeing (2000 [1968]: 135): ‘[T]o see is to have
distance’ (Willerslev 2007: 26). Human geographers have questioned the capacity for
people who have impaired vision to comprehend distance, associating distance with
vision, distinguishing this from ‘proximity’ ‘senses’ such as touch or taste (see Golledge
1997; Kitchin et al. 1997). Willerslev described how things are visible only from certain
distances, for example if one looks too closely there is an experience of blurriness (2007:
29-30). These ideas prompt reflection on what it is to ‘see’ and point to the nature
of visibility. ‘Blurriness’ is in fact an experience of seeing – the visible. Rachel and
Thomas described how they experience a ‘contraction of vision’, manifest as particularly
limited ‘distance vision’. To look at ‘detail’ – described in terms of clear perception of
shape, visible colour rather than ‘light’ or ‘dark’, pattern, and texture – they would both
move their eyes within approximately 15 centimetres of that which they wanted to see.
Thomas demonstrated this with the example of a large green sycamore leaf, extending
his arm and slowly bringing this closer to his eyes until he announced that the ‘green
was now visible’. In what he described as the ‘middle distance’ (which he specified as
around 15 to 20 metres), he only identified colours in terms of ‘light’ and ‘dark’. Closer
proximity, rather than greater ‘distance’, was therefore imperative to his perception of
colour range. Thiswas sensorially emplaced: the distance beyond the length of Thomas’s
outstretched handswithin canopiedwoodlandwasmost often visible as darkness, whilst
the consistency of the light in the open downland afforded experiences of seeing shapes,
outlines, and colours discernible as ‘light’ or ‘dark’.
Seeing in the ‘mind’s eye’
I think I would be correct in saying that most people believe that those who are totally blind
see nothing but blackness. Inmy case this is not so, and, furthermore, blackness is something I
rarely experience.Wherever I am andwhatever I amdoing,mymind provides almost constant
imagery for me.
Karl
Blindness can be an intensely visual experience. It was surreal and sometimes
uncanny the way that Karl and Elen, who both have no visual perception through their
anatomical eyes and had lost their sight over twenty years ago, narrated what they could
‘see’ during our walks. This was described as ‘seeing in the mind’s eye’, an experience
of seeing without vision through anatomical eyes, which is accounted for in various
fascinating memoirs of sight loss (including Hull 1997 and Torey 2003). ‘Seeing in the
mind’s eye’ has been explained in the neurosciences as a ‘phantom vision’ experienced
amongst people who have non-congenitally impaired vision (Menon et al. 2005: 349;
Schultz & Melzack 1991: 809). It is thus biographically constituted and reflective of
previous experiences of seeing with anatomical eyes, pointing to the temporalities
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infused in perceptual experience.AsBergson explained, ‘[T]here is no perceptionwhich
is not full ofmemories, wemingle a thousand details out of our past experience’ (cited in
Howes 2005: 181). This phenomenon shifts understanding of what can be ‘visible’ and
the nature of how the ‘visual’ presents in the rehabituation to ‘blindness’. This requires an
inclusively sensorial and sensorially emplaced approach to elucidate the kaleidoscopic,
transitory nature of the sensory body and experience.
When I started walking with Karl in 2010, he described his experience of ‘seeing
in the mind’s eye’ as similar to how he had seen with his anatomical eyes before
losing his sight in that the ‘visual images’ he saw were three-dimensional, moving,
coloured, with depth and field. These visuals were ‘triggered’ or intentionally created,
but clearly distinguished from hallucinations induced by conditions such as Charles
Bonnet Syndrome.9 Walking along a path at the edge of the woodland with his guide
dog Roxy, Karl described,
It’s constantly happening but things are triggering it in the sense that – Roxy’s back there, so I see her
back there – information comes and that influences it … Yeah and if there was no sound, it would
probably be just misty, just grey … As soon as I hear a sound or walk somewhere different, it opens
up more. So, a bird gives you depth, you think ‘yeah, there’s a tree there’ and start seeing it.
This ‘triggering’ in the perception of a ‘presence’ – the sound or feel of a tree, for example
– instantly resulted in seeing the source. Visual images could also appear randomly or be
intentionally ‘built’ (cf. Torey 2003). Some visuals were hard tomanipulate: for example,
both Elen and Karl saw their bags as different colours to me but could not change this
even if they wanted to as it had ‘set’. Whilst this experience is referred to as ‘visual’,
I agree with Mitchell’s assertion that there is no ‘such thing as an exclusively, purely
visual medium’ (2002: 175), hence the necessity for an inclusively sensorial approach.
This phenomenon calls for an inclusively sensorial approach that recognizes ‘whole
body seer[s]’, where ‘perception is no longer specialized or located in a specific part
of the body, but the whole body becomes an organ of perception’ (Hull 2001). ‘Seeing
in the mind’s eye’, as a ‘phantom vision’, is birthed but severed from anatomical eyes.
Merleau-Ponty’s (2005 [1962]: 164) notions of the habitual body and present body
are useful to examine the temporal qualities of sensory capacities. The experience of
‘seeing’ independently from anatomical eyes experienced amongst people who have
non-congenital blindness has been explained as a ‘visual analogue of the phantom
limb phenomena’ (Schultz & Melzack 1991: 809; cf. Menon et al. 2005: 349). Merleau-
Ponty identified the ‘phantom limb’ experience as an example of body temporality,
which is not the order of ‘objective time’ (2005 [1962]: 189). This ‘haunting of the
present by a particular past experience is possible because we all carry our past with
us insofar as its structures have become “sedimented” in our “habitual body”’ (Langer
1989: 33). ‘Phantom’ phenomena are thus not a recollection or idea but an ‘ambivalent
presence’ (Merleau-Ponty 2005 [1962]: 163) or ‘quasi-presence’ – a ‘former presence
which cannot decide to recede to the past’ (2005 [1962]: 169). The habitual body
therefore refers to the sum of previous experience, customary habituations, and the pre-
reflexive quality of embodiment; whilst the present body refers to present experience
which the habitual body is active through.
‘Seeing in the mind’s eye’ is afforded by the previous capacity to see in the medium
of light through anatomical eyes.10 The qualities of what is seen may therefore embody
perspectives of the past. Karl evocatively described his ‘mind vision’ as always being
from the ‘perspective’ of a child. He explained that this is because he experienced most
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of his sight during his childhood, before it rapidly deteriorated in his teens. This was
manifest, he described, as a vivid sense of colour, especially primary colours, which
he was ‘attracted’ to as a child. The perspective from which he saw in his ‘mind’s
eye’, he explained, was from a shorter height than he would now see with anatomical
eyes as it reflected his height as a child. Karl elucidated that he is not sure ‘how big
things look from the perspective of an adult’, although he feels and listens from his
present adult perspective. His sense of the body in proportion and position within
the environment when ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’ is therefore not equivalent to
that which it is in other activities of perception. This sensorially emplaced approach
indicates that there are potentially multiple perspectives and proportions of the lived,
sensory body. There is not an experiential singularity of the body schema – as the non-
conscious operative performance of the body positioning within and responding to
the environment (Gallagher 1986: 548). The diversity of this embodiment in varied
activities of perception thus shifts senses of relationality to and within the environment.
This is unlikely to be restricted to the experience of vision impairment, but is relevant
to other forms of rehabituation and rehabilitation more broadly.
Over time,Karl andElen have rehabituated to their present ‘blindness’. Their capacity
to ‘see in the mind’s eye’ has faded and its qualities have changed. Things look quite
different to how they did when they saw through their anatomical eyes, but neither of
them have yet experienced what Hull referred to as ‘deep blindness’ (1997: 181). This is
the point atwhich the very idea of seeing becomes abstract andone resembles somebody
whose blindness is congenital. Thus, although the experience of ‘seeing in the mind’s
eye’ is recognizable as a ‘phantom vision’, it is transfigured. It is transfigured in both
the form of what is seen and the activities of seeing. The subject of what is seen might
change: for example, both Elen and Karl saw presences such as sound. The location of
the ‘mind’s eye’– fromwhere one sees – also changed. Elen andKarl described how their
initial experiences of ‘seeing in themind’s eye’ involved seeing from the location of their
anatomical eyes.11 Over the years, they began to see frommultiple perspectives, angles,
and directions, including seeing from the back of their head. Yet this was still located
within the head – if from any 360 degree point – and could not be intentionally relocated
to see from another part of the body. In this way, ‘seeing in the mind’s eye’ is both a
‘phantom vision’ and a reconfigured inclusively sensorial way of seeing in rehabituating
to the present body.
The visual qualities of what Karl and Elen saw in their ‘mind’s eye’ were not
consistent, but sensorially emplaced and inclusively sensorial. Karl described how what
he saw in his ‘mind’s eye’ reflected – or was a kind of ‘seeing through’ – his physical and
emotional states. As we sat on the warm ground amongst the cedar trees, he explained
that when he feels awake and alert, his ‘mind vision’ is ‘more vivid’ and ‘much sharper’.
When he is tired, his ‘mind vision’ is
just duller and – like, imagine a real lovely painting. It can be real sharp and clear, and it is like someone
has smeared it a bit, sort ofmade it smeary – not so defined, the edges aren’t defined. So, it is definition
really. But if I am more awake, there is more definition … so it still does that in my brain, because I
can’t see anything.
Karl described how the ‘colour tones’ of ‘the overall image’ changed with the qualities
of the weather, and particularly temperatures:
Sometimes I get tints of colours. Like the other day, everything was slightly green. And if it’s a lovely
clear spring day – that’s what I love about spring. Because if you get the sun out, but the air’s cool, it
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gives you a blue sense – that everything is blue. That lovely kind of electric blue, but not electric, but
light blue. And it just feels so good. Everything is tinted with this crystal-clear blueness, you know –
it’s beautiful.
He described this as ‘like wearing coloured glasses’. These colour tones were mostly
primary colours – yellow, blue, red, and green – which Karl explained to be the
base colours from colouring books he had as a child before his sight significantly
deteriorated. ‘Cooler colours’, specifically green and blue, were seen when the
temperature was colder or there was an icy wind. ‘Warmer tone colours’ like red
and yellow were experienced with the heat of the sun. Now that his eyes were ‘no
longer useful for seeing’, Karl described how he used them to perceive temperatures,
enjoying staring into the sun. Whilst ‘seeing in the mind’s eye’ might be described as
an ‘interior’ perceptual experience, it embodies the sensorially emplaced qualities of the
environment, and the physical and emotional states of the seer. Aswith the ethnography
of seeing presented in the previous section, the perceiver and the environment are
merged in perception. There is no perception of the environment from a distanced or
separate perspective. This experience of physical and emotional states shaping what is
seen is not necessarily restricted to people who have impaired vision either – perhaps
emotionally embodied experiences such as drowsiness, excitement, boredom, and panic
all have the potential to shape the qualities of what and how people see.
Whilst I was walking with Elen through the woodlands, she described how ‘seeing
in the mind’s eye’ had eventually become a ‘loose dream’ that no longer resembled
seeing as she had previously experienced or recognized it. This was because she now
principally saw sound. She explained, ‘Well, for example, when we are walking through
the forest and it is getting very closed in again, I don’t see the trees. I see dark. I see
sound’. Elen did not see the environment around her as tall trees, sloping hills, or
winding paths, but saw sound as a ‘pressure wave’. She described this with the example
of her guide dog Charles’s bell:
Elen: Umm, how do I describe it? Not like colour, but more like a pressure wave.
Karis: Wow, but you see it as a shape then?
Elen: Yeah. In my head I do. In my third eye – if that’s what you want to call it – mind’s eye. I see it
more as – for example, I can put a colour to it because for me the sound of Charles’s bell is silver.
Karis: Righhhtt. And you literally see that in your mind’s eye, going around?
Elen: Yeah, yeah. And those birds that I am hearing sound like to me – the sound I am getting is gold,
like small hand bell.
Lighter colours, Elen explained, reflected ‘pleasant sounds’, whilst darker colours
visualized the unknown or darkness. The felt sense of being enclosed within the
woodland, for example, was seen as ‘blackness’ or ‘absence’, rather than seeing the
trees. Sound was the colour and image within that darkness. It appeared that ‘seeing
in the mind’s eye’ for Elen and occasionally Karl too was the visualization of sensorial
perceptions that were now more strongly present since losing their sight, especially
sound. Yet rather than seeing the source of the sound, as they would have before
losing their sight, the sound was seen. To illustrate, instead of the bark of a dog
‘triggering’ a visual image of the dog in the ‘mind’s eye’, the bark was now the visualized
presence.12 Similarly, Elen explained how she now ‘actually sees the wind’ rather than
the ‘things’ that the windmoves, such as the leaves amongst the trees or the high grasses
lively in the breeze. This is because she feels the wind, whereas she might have no
perceptual experience of the trees or grasses it ruffles unless this sound is in earshot.
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Elen now saw what had once been invisible. This is a fundamental reconfiguration of
the ways in which the environment was experienced before sight loss, an alternative
perceptual ontology in which the movement of air is now seen, for example. This
is an environment ‘fully restructured’ (N.J. Morris 2011: 316) in blindness, yet still
embedded with visuality, in which there is an alternative and new experience of what
is ‘visible’. This resists any attempts to distinguish ‘senses’, requiring an inclusively
sensorially emplaced13 approach ‘beyond senses’, and confronts visionist notions of
what constitutes the visible and how this is seen.
Beyond senses
This article has problematized the notion of ‘senses’ as a consistently useful concept
for the study of sensory experience. Whilst scholarly engagement with ‘senses’ has
developed ‘multisensorial’ (e.g. Grasseni 2007a; Pink 2009) and ‘intersensorial’ (e.g.
Connor 2004; Howes 2005) approaches to show the relationships between and varied
configurations of ‘senses’, rather than their segregation, the notion of ‘senses’ has
been sustained nevertheless. This article has sought to go beyond ‘the senses’ by
problematizing their centrality in sensory anthropology and proposing an alternative
approach to how we might study sensory experience. This is necessary given the
sensorial ambiguities of perceptual experiences and the implications of categorizing
these into ‘senses’. The inclusively sensorially emplaced approach proposed avoids
inductive association of anatomy with specific capacities or compartmentalizing
experience into ‘senses’, enabling us to explore the ways in which perceptual experience
is afforded by and specific to the changing and biographically constituted capacities of
the perceiver within the environment.
The article has examined activities of ‘seeing’ amongst people who have impaired
vision to reappraise the very concept of ‘vision’. This approach could also be
used to rethink other sensory experiences, including touch, smell, taste, hearing,
proprioception, and so on. The focus on vision is particularly illuminating given its
centrality within anthropological conceptualizations of ‘senses’, in which it has been
distinguished from and characterized in relation to ‘non-visual’ senses (see Grasseni
2007a; Howes 1991). ‘Blindness’ has been situated as the lack of ‘vision’ (Ingold 2000:
243-88), its opposite (Elkins 1997: 202). An inclusively sensorially emplaced approach
eclipses these binary notions surrounding vision and instead ushers in the elusive,
ambiguous nature of sensorial perception and makes room for the apparent paradox
of ‘seeing’ in ‘blindness’.
A focus on ‘seeing in blindness’ demonstrates the problematic sensory normativity
inherent in an anthropology that relies on the notion of ‘senses’. The ‘normative’ sensory
subject is lodged not just in the majority of visual culture studies, but also in the
anthropology of vision and arguably visual anthropology. This article thusmoves debate
from issues of ‘ocularcentrism’ (as the association of vision with power and knowledge)
to consider how a kind of ‘visionism’ has been produced anthropologically – a
‘visionism’ with inherent assumptions about vision as a given ‘sense’, which usually rests
on notions and characterizations of a normalized 20/20 vision. These arguments pertain
to other characterizations of ‘senses’ built from notions of the normative sensory body,
including, as noted above, what Drever referred to as the ‘pair of golden ears’ inherent
in audiometric norms of aural perception in sound composition (2019: 85). Springing
from and within this notion of (normative) ‘vision’ are senses of what is ‘visual’ (from
‘vision’) and that which is ‘visible’ (through vision). Through an inclusively sensorial
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approach, we can demonstrate spectrums of visibility, mutating forms of the visual and
shifting sensorially emplaced activities of seeing. This is pertinent for those whom my
companions referred to as ‘sighted’ subjects, whose vision is not currently ‘impaired’:
take your glasses off, try to make out the path in the half-light of dusk, drive into the
low winter sun, and experience spectrums of visibility.
This article demonstrates the sensory body as a web of lived experiences and
embodied ways of being that can be associated temporally. Whilst ‘seeing in the
mind’s eye’ can be understood as a ‘phantom’ vision, distinguished through Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of the habitual body manifest through the present body (2005 [1962]:
164), in lived experience this is more a suffusion that is chronologically collapsed,
coalescent, and transfiguring. Perception is permeated with sensory orientations of the
past alive through the body, which are made evident through a sensorially emplaced
approach.
Ocularcentric and perspectival outlooks have dominated notions of self-landscape
relations within Western thought. This has been tied up in notions of ‘vision’ as a
sense (problematized in this article), which have characterized the qualities of this
relationship. The ethnography presented catalyses a reimagination of the notion of
the ‘visual’ and ‘visible’ qualities of landscape through an inclusively sensorial and
sensorially emplaced approach. Experiences of ‘seeing sound’ in the transfigurations
of ‘phantom vision’ revealed alternative perceptual ontologies in which prior notions
of the ‘visual’ qualities of landscape were refracted: trees became blackness, and sound
that was once invisible was now seen as the landscape, for example. Landscape is not
inherently ‘visual’, but nor are the ‘visual’ qualities of landscape as plainly normative as
previously theorized. This landscape is not outside of the perceiver in the ways posited
by perspectival epistemologies of viewing the landscape: perception is a suffusion of
perceiver and the environment. The landscape seen is saturated with colourations
of moods and emotions, speckled with the absences and presences describable as
‘blindness’ and ‘seeing’.
It is clear that neither ‘vision’ nor ‘blindness’ can be homogenized experientially.
Rather than being neat categories indicating substantive perceptual experience, these
are instead broad spectrums of inclusively sensorially and sensorially emplaced
sensuous experience. Whilst anthropologists have come to unpick differentiations
based on ‘culture’, examining the intersectional qualities of subjectivity and sensory
experience, it is apparent that differentiated categories such as ‘vision impairment’
are less than stable. Differentiating experience around ‘abilities’ or qualities of sensory
experience through notions such as ‘vision-impaired’, ‘blind’, or ‘sighted’ is an attempt
to grasp what is essentially mutable, multiple, transitory, and sometimes apparently
paradoxical sensuous experience. This problematizes much phenomenology which
has relied on the single homogenized body, but also sparks concern with how we
include spectrums of experience without producing further homogenizing categories.
Whilst, therefore, this article articulates how experiences amongst people who describe
their vision as ‘impaired’ are relevant to sensory anthropology as a means to rethink
‘sense’-based approaches, it also proposes that we need to transcend potentially limiting
differential identifications.
NOTES
Warmest thanks to my walking companions who traipsed the South Downs landscapes with me through
the changing weathers and seasons. Thank you to colleagues at the University of Sussex anthropology
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department for your generous comments and inspiring conversations, particularly Margaret Sleeboom-
Faulkner, JonMitchell, andMichael Bull. I alsowant to thank ElizabethHallam and two anonymous reviewers
whose insightful comments contributed to the development of this article.
1 All participants have been assigned pseudonyms.
2 The term ‘anatomical eye’ (singular) is used as Rachel has one anatomical eye, whilst her other eye
is physically present but artificial. Throughout this article, I refer to ‘anatomical eyes’ in the plural as all
participants other than Rachel have two anatomical eyes.
3 This is reflective of an ongoing philosophical concern with the domination of vision in terms of the
ways in which people ‘think’ and ‘know’ about the world, referred to as ‘ocularcentrism’ (see Jay 1993; with
reference to the landscape, see Macpherson 2005; with reference to visual studies, see Mitchell 2002: 172-6).
4 ‘Impaired vision’ is used as a general, ‘catch-all’ term that includes anyone who identifies as having
‘impaired’ vision (cf. Bolt 2005). Although it is standard practice in education, services, and advocacy to
use the term ‘vision-impaired’ (Bolt 2005), I will use participants’ preferred terms as these demonstrate
the sensorially emplaced and relational qualities of their changing sensory experiences. Rachel and Thomas
described their vision as ‘impaired’, specifying that they have ‘partial sight’. Elen and Karl identified as ‘blind’
as they have no current vision, distinguishing themselves by having not ‘impaired vision’ but ‘blindness’. The
choices of terminologies are political, relational, and practical (see Bolt 2005).
5 Notably, the majority of my walking companions had very little recent or established experience of
walking in non-urban environments. Urban environments are designed to be ‘legible’ for cane and guide-
dog users through environmental design features such as drop kerbs and concrete surfaces which are ‘legible’
in varied weathers. Established walking practices for urban environments are often redundant in green
settings, where there may not be clear pathways and there are varied ground textures and indistinguishable
environmental features.
6 It is important to clarify that the term ‘capacities’ is usedwithoutnotions of ‘full’ or ‘impaired’ capacities as
a premise. Notions such as ‘impaired’ need critique, though it is not in the scope of this article to attend to this
sufficiently. ‘Capacities’ is preferred over a notion of ‘abilities’, which can insinuate learned skills and infer their
constant possession. Instead, the term ‘capacities’ works well alongside the sensorially emplaced approach
proposed as it is able to reflect the changing and adapting ‘capacities’ of persons, which vary according to the
contexts of differing environments.
7 For further general outline of nystagmus and potential qualities, see 2019a.
8 Merleau-Ponty developed these ideas throughout Phenomenology of perception (2005 [1962]: esp. 142-7).
9 Charles Bonnet Syndrome (CBS) is the experience of visual hallucinations which may occur for people
who have non-congenital sight loss. These hallucinations can occur weeks or months following sight
deterioration and are not related to mental health (2019b). CBS cannot be controlled, whilst ‘seeing in the
mind’s eye’ was distinguished as a way of seeing that can usually be manipulated and ‘imaginative’.
10 There is, however, significant research within cognitive and brain sciences investigating if (and how)
people who are congenitally blind may have ‘visual’ experiences, for example when dreaming or stimulating
the visual cortex. A key question has been whether the experience of ‘visual’ imagery is dependent on ‘visual’
perception via anatomical eyes or whether it can emerge from activation of the visual cortex in the brain via
‘non-visual inputs’ (see Da Silva 2003: 328).
11 Despite associating the ‘mind’s eye’ with their anatomical eyes (as a ‘phantom’), Karl and Elen referred
to the ‘mind’s eye’ as singular rather than plural. McGinn examined the experience of seeing in the ‘mind’s
eye’, referring to it as a form of imaginative seeing, for people who are sighted (2004 [1950]). He noted that
‘we don’t suppose that we have two mind’s eyes, to match two bodily eyes’ and considered the reasoning for
this (McGinn 2004 [1950]: 46-7). He pointed to the flattened experience of depth in the ‘mind’s eye’ in the
absence of binocularity and highlighted that it is ‘all or nothing’ in that we cannot close an eye of the mind
(McGinn 2004 [1950]: 46-7). There is not sufficient space in this article to address these propositions with
reference to the experience of blindness. The transition from seeing with the ‘mind’s eye’ (whichmight not be
consistently singular for everyone) to seeing through potentially binocular sight restored with surgery would
make an interesting case study.
12 Although this might be conventionally understood as ‘synaesthesia’, this notion assumes an interaction
or crossover of discrete and identifiable ‘senses’, which is counter to the inclusively sensorial approach
outlined.
13 I use the term ‘inclusively sensorially emplaced’ as a shorthand to refer to ‘inclusively sensorial’ and
‘sensorially emplaced’ approaches used in combination.
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Au-delà des sens : perception, environnement et déficience visuelle
Résumé
Le « virage sensoriel » de l’anthropologie est à l’origine d’une littérature considérable sur la perception
et l’expérience sensorielles. Si cette littérature critique souvent le cloisonnement des différents « sens »,
la manière dont les anthropologues pourraient examiner la perception sensorielle au-delà des « sens »
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reste peu explorée. Sur la base d’une étude ethnographique de terrain auprès de personnes atteintes de
déficience visuelle parcourant à pied le paysage des South Downs, en Angleterre, cet article développe une
telle approche. Il suggère que les expériences visuelles des aveugles remettent en cause la conceptualisation
de la « vision » (et de la « non-vision »). À la place de la « vision » (en tant que sens), l’article explore les
« activités du voir », une approche qui contextualise le visuel afin d’examiner la nature biographiquement
constituée et idiosyncrasique de la perception au sein d’un environnement. À travers une ethnographie du
voir, qu’il s’agisse de ce que perçoivent les yeux ou de « représentations de l’esprit », l’autrice propose une
approche qui évite d’associer la perception à l’anatomie ou de compartimenter l’expérience en différents
« sens ».
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